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CASE-COMMENT
ARROWSMITH NEEDS A DOCTOR:





On November 10, 1952, the United States Supreme Court decided
the case of Arrowsmith v. Commissioner.' The problem involved was of
general interest and application, and the final decision was long awaited.
The writers agree with the holding of the Court, and with the reasoning
involved. It'does, however, give rise to a general class of inequities for
which relief should be provided. The writers believe that this relief is
up to Congress, and should be brought to the attention of the appropriate
Congressional tax committees.
NATURE OF THE DECISION
In the Arrowsmith case the taxpayers, in 1937, liquidated and
divided the proceeds of a corporation which they owned. Partial distribu-
tions were made in 1937, 1938, and 1939, and a final distribution was
made in 1940. Taxpayers reported the profits obtained from this trans-
action as capital gain. In 1944, a judgment was rendered against the old
corporation. Taxpayers, as transferees, paid the judgment. On their tax
return they deducted the loss as an ordinary loss rather than as a capital
loss. The Commissioner viewed the 1944 payment as part of the original
liquidation transaction and required its classification as a capital loss,
consistent with the treatment of the original transaction as a capital
gain. The Supreme Court resolved the problem in favor of the Commis-
sioner. Its position may be summed up in the following quotation:
It is contended, however, that this payment which would have been a capital
transaction in 1940 was transformed into an ordinary business transaction in
1944 because of the well-established principle that each taxable year is a
separate unit for tax accounting purposes. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S.
590; North American Oil Co. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417. But this principle is
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not breached by considering all the 1937-1944 liquidation transaction events
in order properly to classify the nature of the 1944 loss for tax purposes.
Such an examination is not an attempt to reopen and readjust the 1937 to
1940 tax returns, an action that would be inconsistent with the annual tax
accounting principle.
As stated previously, the writers agree with the reasoning of the
Court. In fact, in an article entitled "Not a Gain Again, Again and
Again", published in Taxes-The Tax Magazine, in June 1952, by one
of the present writers, the same reasoning was set forth. In that article
the Switlik2 case was criticized and the Arrowsmith case (also called the
Bauer case) was urged as the correct decision and, in view of the conflict,
it was anticipated "that the problem will eventually be referred to the
United States Supreme Court for decision." Now it is decided, but the
decision creates further disturbances.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION-INEQUITIES
Although the decision is correct in principle, the Arrowsmith rule
will lead to inequities in a great variety of situations.
The first case involves the factual situation of the Arrowsmith case
itself. Taxpayer reported and paid taxes on capital gains in 1938, 1939
and 1940. In 1944 it had to make a repayment which, for tax purposes,
is regarded as a capital loss. Under present rules the taxpayer may apply
that loss against capital gains in 1944, and carry any unused balance to
be similarly applied for the next five years. Further, if taxpayer is an
individual, he may also apply the capital loss against ordinary income to
the extent of $1,000 a year for each of the six year period just described.
However, what may he do where he has no capital gains during the six
year period, and where the loss may be too large to be substantially
satisfied at the rate of $1,000 a year for six years. For example, suppose
that Arrowsmith reported a capital gain in the liquidation of $500,000.
Further, suppose that in 1944 he was required to repay $100,000, and
that he had no capital gains during the next six years or, perhaps, more
capital losses. Under such circumstances he would have paid a capital
gains tax on profits of $100,000 that he never really made.
In the Arrowsmith case the capital gain arose from liquidation
which, for tax purposes, is treated under I. R. C. section 115 (c) as a
sale of stock. Suppose, in fact, that the gain was from an actual sale
of stock. For example, taxpayer is retiring from business and sells the
entire capital stock of his company. He makes a profit of $500,000 and
reports it for tax purposes as a long-term capital gain. In subsequent
years he must repay, for one reason or another (e.g., fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, breach of warranty, etc.), $100,000 of the proceeds of the sale
2 Commissioner v. Switlik, 184 F. 2d 299 (3d Cir. 1950).
of the stock. Since he then has a capital loss of $100,000, he is in the
unhappy position of having no capital gains against which to take the
deduction. Again he has lost the tax on $100,000. This very situation
may have arisen in the case of Duveen Brothers.8 The petitioner, in order
to sell a large block of stock which was callable at $11 per share, agreed
to pay purchasers of the stock the difference between the purchase price
and the $11 redemption price. The stock was sold during the years
1943 and 1944.at prices in excess of the redemption price. The stock was
called, and the petitioner, in 1945, paid the purchasers the amount
guaranteed to them. The Court held that the 1945 payment was a long-
term capital loss.
Since the taxpayer may not deduct the loss against the prior gain, he
must hope for future gains to get the deduction. Thus he paid tax on
profits that he didn't really make. The type of situations in which this
inequity may arise are endless. They involve just a few variables. First,
there must be a transaction from which a capital gain results.
The facts of the Arrowsmith and Duveen' cases are only illustrative.
There may be a public issue by the insiders of a closely held corporation,
or one stockholder may sell all or part of his interest to another, or any
other facts which give rise to a capital gain. Second, circumstances must
exist which give rise to a repayment in a future year, which repayment is
a capital loss (per the doctrine of the Arrowsmith case). In addition
to the situations previously discussed, there may be innumerable other
cases leading to the same result. For example, the repayment may be
occasioned by fraudulent misrepresentations involved in the sale, and sub-
sequent suit and recovery thereon. This occurred in the cases of Margery
K. Megargel' and Harwick v. Commissioner.' Or, the misrepresentations
may exist in the absence of fraud, and yet require repayment. Or, there
may have been a mistake which later requires the seller to reimburse the
buyer. Third, the party who later sustains the capital loss must not be
in a position to obtain a tax deduction or other benefit from the loss.
OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION
Not every situation involving the doctrine of the Arrowsmith case
will result in harm or inequity. As a general rule, inequity results only
when the three factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph are present.
For example, if the original transaction resulted in a loss and the seller
subsequently recovers additional funds, no harm is apt to result. Or, if the
original transaction is a gain transaction and the seller subsequently
8 Duveen Brothers v. Commissioner, 17 T. C. 124 (1951), aff'd, 197 F. 2d 118 (2d
Cif. 1952), cert. denied, 244 U. S. 884 (1952).
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collects more monies, no harm is done. Or, if the original transaction is
a loss transaction and the seller later must pay additional funds to the
buyer, the seller has not been hurt. Finally, if the basic transaction is a
gain deal, and seller later sustains a loss through repayment, there is
still little harm to be done, if any, where the seller has capital gains in
the year of loss or subsequent years which to offset the loss.
This article will not attempt to analyze the possible effects of the
Arrowsmith reasoning on the tax law in general. In other words, as a
general proposition it may be interesting to explore the extent to which
a transaction in one year may be colored by facts which occurred in, a
prior or later year, particularly in view of the "annual accounting con-
cept" which has become fairly well fixed in our tax law. In the Arrow-
smith case the conclusion of the Court was regarded by it as consistent
with the "annual accounting concept", but there may be situations where
resort to circumstances of another year to determine the character of a
transaction in the taxable year may violate or threaten the "annual ac-
counting concept".
SUGGESTED METHODS OF RELIEF
There are several possible ways in which the aforementioned in-
equities may be relieved.
An obvious answer is to permit the taxpayer to carry back the loss
to the year in which the profit from the basic transaction was reported,
and obtain a refund. This is objectionable for several reasons. First,
it will require a longer period of limitations for the right to file refund
claims. This is inconsistent with the desired policy of closing tax returns
once and for all, as manifested by the present period of limitations.
Further, the Government would undoubtedly be given the right to find
offsets against the refund. Thus a tax return could be opened many
years after it would normally be closed by the statute of limitations.
Another objection is that the legislation would be of a patchwork char-
acter, and would apply to only a narrow group of cases.
A second, and broader approach to the solution of this type of in-
equity, as well as of other inequities, is to permit the carryback, as well
as the carryforward, of capital losses. The period of the carryback is, of
course, to be decided by Congress. A simple approach might be to have
the carryback for one year, as with net operating losses, since capital
losses have the same five year carryforward as net operating losses. Thus
the capital loss carryback and carryforward provisions would cover exactly
the same period as do the net operating loss carryback and carryforward
provisions. This may not solve the problem completely, since the gain
transaction may have occurred more than one year prior to the year of
the loss arising therefrom. However, it will be of some help and time
will tell us whether a longer carryback period is in order.
This change will not merely relieve the problem discussed herein.
It may also relieve a more generally disturbing situation. That is, the
case of the market trader or other businessman who makes a large capital
gain one year and then, to his surprise, loses it right back in later years.
At that point he has paid taxes, and lost the use of tax dollars, on
profits that he didn't really make. Further, if he doesn't continue his
operations, his opportunity to utilize the later capital loss may be gone
forever. To that extent he may, for tax reasons, be encouraged to con-
tinue a business operation against his better judgment, or to otherwise
engage in speculative operations, since he is in a position to make a
capital gain at no tax cost. As indicated previously, the one year capital
loss carryback may not relieve all inequitable cases, but it should do
a lot of good. Experience will teach us whether equity dictates extending
the period of the carryback for more than one year.
